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CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CUSTODY DISPUTES

By:
Frederick H. Zemans
Osgoode Hall Law School of
York University
Downsview, Ontario

Blackstone, in his Commentaries, says:
The last duty of pa rents to their children is that
of giving them an education suitable to their situation in life; a duty pointed out by reason and of
far the greatest importance of any. For as Puffendorf
very well observes 'it is not easy to imagine or allow
that a parent has conferred any considerable benefit
upon his child by bringing him into the world, if he
afterwards entirely neglects his cul tu re and education,
and suffers him to grow up like a mere beast, to lead
a life useless to others and shameful to himself'. Yet
the municipal laws of most countries seem to be defective on this point by not constraining the parent to
bestow proper education upon his children. Perhaps
they thought it punishment enough to leave the parent
who neglects the instruction of his family to labour
under those griefs and inconveniences which his family
so unin~tructed will be sure to bring upon him. Our
laws, though their defects in this particular cannot
be denied, have in one instance made a wise provision
for breeding up the rising generation; since the poor
and laborious part of the community when past the age
of nurture a'r e · taken out of the hands of their parents
by the statutes for apprenticing poor children; and
are placed out by the public in such a manner as may
render their abilities in their several stations of the
greatest advantage to the commonwealth. The rich,
indeed, are left at their option whether they will breed
up their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their
family. 11
l
11

The Commentaries give us a perspective of the expectations of
medieval English society and its laws with respect to child rearing and
the transmission of community values. Canada has inherited the common
laws• values as articulated by Blackstone and has attempted to integrate
them into its very different society.
Heterogeneous and pluralistic, Canada's society contains numerous cultural groups, each of which maintain distinct and independent traditions as well as the various national and religious institutions required
to support these traditions. 2
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Our Confederation was conceived in the nineteenth century
within a context of biculturalism and has been expanded during the
twentieth century to include multi-culturalism. In describing the Confederation debates, Ramsay Cook wrHes that:
... there can be no doubt that the Fathers, French
and English, were intent upon the establishment of
a "new nationality". Speaker after speaker in the
Confederation debates emphasized this point. But it
seems equally true that none of the Fathers intended
or expected that the new nation would be culturally
and linguistically homogeneous. It was to be a political nation in which cultyral differences were
accepted as une chose donnee.
3
French and English Canadians have maintained, and perhaps strengthened, their independent cultural traditions since these debates. Peoples
from numerous cultures have immigrated to Canada without losing their cultural traditions in the acculturation process of adapting to a new country. 4
Compounded with the empirical fact of our multicultural society
is the phenomenon of the continuing growing concern with cultural and familial roots. People of every culture are rediscovering their heritage and
reasserting their traditions. This greater consciousness of heritage and,
consequently, of Canada s cultural diversity has manifested itself at the
national level. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism perceived that Canadian society could achieve 11 unity in diversity 11 by integrating its heterogeneous elements into a harmonious system. 5 In 1971, the
Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, reasserted the views of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission by initiating a new multicultural policy:
1

National unity if it is to mean anything in the deeply
personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's
own individual identity; out of this can grow respect
for that of others and a willingness to share ideas,
attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence.
It can form the base of a society which is based on fair
play for all.
,6
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This focus upon multiculturalism and cultural diversity is
not by accident nor is it a passing fad. It is a consciousness that has
fundamental credence. In what is a seemingly paradoxical existence, man
is an individual who desires to live in a social world; a fine balance is
maintained between our being individuals and our being members of a
larger social group. In a society where increased mechanization and mass
media reduce man to the common social denominator of anonymity, the
balance swings heavily against individualism. Reasserting our cultural
diversity is one way in which the b~lance is maintained; by emphasizing
cultural differences the citizen is able to distinguish himself and perceive himself as an individual against the backdrop of Canadian society.
Our concern for cultural diver?ity and identity is as necessary as the
empirical fact of our individualism. Cultural diversity is a reality within Canadian society. It is a reality for which there is a legitimate and
a necessary basis for consideration by all institutions including the
Canadian judiciary.
Within the context of family law, judges must deal with cultural
diversity in a number of situations. For example, a court may be asked to
determine whether a Native Indian child is in need of protection and
should be removed from the parents. · To determine if the child is in need
of protection, should the judge apply criteria for removal which reflect
the values of his culture or should the criteria reflect the cultural values
of the Native community? If the Native child is apprehended, should he be
removed from the Native community or be temporarily placed with a relative
or friend? Should the court go the additional step and allow the child to
be adopted by non-Native parents? In other instances, judges may have to
determine matters of custody or access in a situation where each parent
offers a distinct cultural or religious environment for the child's upbringing. How can the judiciary choose which cultural environment would be best
for the child without injecting its own cultural values into the determination?
What is needed and what must be elucidated are a set of guiding
principles which enable the judiciary to make consistent and predictable
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custodial determinations in as many situations as possible in which
diverse cultural values come into contact and conflict. Ideally, such
guidelines should be equally applicable to child welfare proceedings and
adoptions, as well as to custody or access determinations. In addition,
if such a set of principles are to be applicable cross-culturally, then
they must attempt to avoid an emphasis of the culture of the Canadian
majority or for that matter of one segment of Canadian society. A set of
principles to be used within any cultural context has no legitimacy if
premised upon the values of one culture only. This goal sets a unique
challenge to the Canadian judiciary which has traditionally been composed
of upper-middle class men from similar cultural backgrounds.
Such a set of principles may be no more than general guidelines.
It would be difficult to prescribe specific, exhaustive criteria for dealing with family law issues which involve cultural conflict. The essence
of any culture is its own particular formulation of the family institution.
There is no a priori concept of the family; it is defined by those practices
of the particular culture w~th which one is dealing. For example, in one
culture the family may be perceived as a fairly small, nuclear unit while
in other cultures there may be an extended concept of the family whereby
grandparents, aunts, uncles and other relatives or perhaps the whole
community are perceived as the family. With cultural values built into the
concept of the family itself, it is therefore not surprising that no clearly
defined criteria can be described to enable the legislature or the judiciary
to deal with cultural diversity in either internal family disputes or disputes between the family and the state.
In dealing with cultural diversity the judiciary has at its disposal a threshold principle of state intervention. At some minimum level,
where the child 1 s physical or mental well being is threatened with irreversible damage, it is the state's and therefore the judiciary's role to
intervene. Although various cultures tolerate different degrees of physical
and mental punishment this is only a reason for setting the threshold of
intervention at a high level and not a reason for excluding state interven-
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tion. 7 State intervention at some level is grounded in the non-cultural
premise that if we are to live in a social world - if we are to have a
viable community - society must set minimal standards which protect the
lives of its individual members.
Beyond this threshold principle, another fundamental principle
or guiding notion is the recognition or consciousness that the judiciary
has few absolute values at its disposal when dealing with family law
matters within a context of cultural diversity. The bench must struggle
with the realization that it is working within the realm of the relative
where nothing is self-evident. The task of the court is to recognize and
to identify the various cultural values with which it is confronted and
to strike a balance between them. Consciousness of this recognition and
balancing process was dealt with most explicitly by the United States
Supreme Court in .W1sconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205.
Wisconsin v. Yoder is a landmark case with implications for
common law jurisdictions which extend well beyond the American border. It
acknowledges and pays deference to cultural values other than those prescribed and administered by the state. The respondents were members of the
Old Order Amish religion who were convicted for violating Wisconsin's
compulsory school attendance law. The statute required children to attend
a sanctioned form of schooling until the age of 16. The respondents were
removing their children from school after the completion of the eighth grade.
The issue for judicial determination was whether the state's interest in
educating its youth superseded the constitutional protection given to
individuals to exercise their religion freely. Based upon considerable
expert evidence, the court, with Chief Justice Burger delivering the
majority opinion, found that the Amish religion necessarily encompassed a
way of life which would be threatened if children continued their schooling
within the public system after grade eight. The values that the children
would be exposed to during their formative adolescent years would not be
compatible with the way of life of the Old Order Amish community. Compulsory education therefore threatened the Amish religion. The court stated
its findings as follows:
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The conclusion is inescapable that secondary
schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly
influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and
values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially
interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child and his integration into the way of
life of the Amish faith community at the crucial
adolescent stage of development, contravenes the
basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish
faith, both as to the parent and the child.
(at p. 218)
Having found that the Amish religion would be jeopardized by
exposing Amish children to higher education, the court had to decide
whether the state's interest in educating its youth still superseded the
protection of the Amish religion. The court was highly conscious of the
balancing exercise it had to undertake:
Thus, a State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free
from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing
of their children so long as they, in the words of
Pierce, 11 prepare [them] for additional obligations 11 •
(at p. 214)
The court found that even though the state had a legitimate interest in
enforcing its education regulations, the Amish community had succeeded in
providing the necessary education for its children. Indeed, the expert
evidence went so far as to show that the Amish~
... system of learning-by-doing was an 11 ideal system 11
of education in terms of preparing Amish children for
life as adults in the Amish community, and that ur
would be inclined to say they do a better job in this
than most of the rest of us do, .
(at p. 223)
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The court concluded that the state's interest in education did not supersede the protection afforded to the Amish religion.
Wisconsin v. Yoder is significant because it deals explicitly
with the careful balancing of diverse cultural values or concerns and
because it is highly conscious of the fact that there are no absolutes
when dealing with such cultural issues. Mr. Justice Burger stated that:
There can be no assumption that today s majority is
11
right 11 and the Amish and others like them are 11 wrong 11 •
A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to
be condemned because it is different.
(at pp. 223-224)
1

The court cautioned that it must perform its role with the utmost of care:
This should suggest that courts must move with great
circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate
task of weighing a State 1 s legitimate social concern
when faced with religious claims for exemption from
generally applicable educational requirements.
(at p. 235)
Wisconsin v. Yoder must be considered from the perspective of the
time and the setting that the decision was written. Firstly, it is an
American decision dealing with explicit constitutional protections of religious freedom. The court stressed that the Amish way of life is both an
outgrowth and aspect of the Amish religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder is a case in
which religious freedom was at issue and it is unlikely that such protection
would be afforded to secular interests. In addition, the court found that
the Amish were providing adequate education, if not better education, for
their children. Nor was this a case involving a confl~ct of constrasting
values. The court considered the expert testimony which indicated that the
Amish way of life exemplified many of the fundamental values of American
society:
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their i di osyncrasi es as seen by the majority,
this record strongly shows that the Amish community
has been a highly successful social unit within our
society, even if apart from the conventional 11 mainstream11. Its members are productive and very 1awabi ding members of society; they reject public welfare
in any of its usual modern forms. (at p. 222)

~Jhatever

Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel and
reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson s ideal of
the 11 sturdy yoeman 11 who would form the basis of what
he considered as the ideal of a democratic society.
Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the
diversity we profess to admire and encourage.
(at pp. 225-226)
1

Wisconsin v. Yoder was therefore a good, and perhaps easy, case
for the U.S. Supreme Court to show deference to the values of another
culture. It was also a case which allowed the court to reiterate its
commitment to family life, hard work and agrarian values at a time in
American history when the Vietnam war and the sixties were threatening a
cultural upheaval which was discrediting traditional values. It is not
clear that the same result would have been obtained had there been more
cultural divergence. Nevertheless, Wisconsin v. Yoder stands for the
principle of judicial consciousness of cultural diversity wherein the
judiciary both acknowledges and balances various cultural interests.
Mr. Justice William Douglas' partial dissent in Wisconsin v.
Yoder should be mentioned because of its recognition of the rights of a
third party to the dispute - the Amish children. Douglas agreed with the
majority that Amish values were in opposition to the education requirements
of schooling beyond grade eight. However, he noted that the majority s
analysis treated the dispute as being one between Amish parents and the
state and that at no point were the rights of the Amish children considered.
Douglas argued that children are 11 persons 11 within the meaning of the
American Bill of Rights and cited precedents where children had their constitutional interests protected. Even though the Amish children were not
parties to the action, Douglas argued that because of their constitutional
1
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rights, the religious exemption for Amish parents could not be granted
unless the views and the rights of the Amish children were also considered. Douglas puts his position as follows:
It is the student's judgment, not his parents',
that is essential if we are to give full meaning
to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and
of the right of students to be masters of their
own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way
of life by those in authority over him and if his
education is truncated, his entire life may be
stunted and deformed. The child, therefore, should
be given an opportunity to be heard before the
State gives the exemption which we honor today. (at pp. 245-246)
Douglas therefore directed that the decision be reserved until the various
views of the Amish children were elicited. If the Amish children did
desire to attend high school then 11 the state may well be able to override
the parents' religiously motivated objections". (at p. 242) Douglas also
considered that the majority's emphasis on the law and order record of the
Amish people was irrelevant. He argued that any religious group is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
In Canada, cases dealing with education and religion are sparse
and none deal with the issues as directly or thoroughly as Wisconsin v. Yoder.
In Regina v. Wiebe, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 36, Oliver Prov.J. dealt
with a factual situation similar to Wisconsin v. Yoder. The accused was a
Mennonite charged with contravening the provisions of the School Act.
Members of the Mennonite community had withdrawn their children from the
public school system on the basis that the system was teaching their children
values which were not in accordance with their religious beliefs. The court
found that the Mennonite religion was closely linked to education and the
education of Mennonite children was given protection under the freedom of
religion clause of the Alberta Bill of Rights. The Department of Education
Act was rendered inoperative by the Alberta Bill of Rights and the accused
was found not guilty. The decision is a reflective discussion of the
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principles encountered in Wisconsin v. Yoder and it recognized that:
.•. there exists a plethora of evidence not only
of deep religious convictions sincerely held by
the accused concerning the manner in which his
child should be educated, but also of an unshakeable determination to educate his child in
accordance with his religious beliefs. The law
of Alberta would, without f i rst permitting him
re course to the courts, penal i ze him fo r this on
the basis of absolute l iability .
(at p. 62)
The earlier case of Chabot v. Lamorandiere (1958), 12 D.L.R.
(2d) 796 (Que.Q.B., C.A.) also skirted the issue but was more specifically
a statement of religious rights in the context of education. There, the
court held that a member of a religious sect may compel acceptance of his/
her children into the publicly funded schools and may also insist that
they Qe exempted from religious exercises. Pratte J. stated at 803 that
there is a right to instruct in one's own religion but not a right to
impose it. In this case, the only school available was a Roman Catholic
school - no dissident or Protestant school existed in the municipality,
as allowed by the legislation. Rinfret J., dissenting, said at 827 that
the parents had three alternative under the legislation: to have their
children attend the majority (i.e., in this case Roman Catholic) school
and follow the curriculum, to declare they were dissidents and set up
their own school (this parent was apparently the only Jehovah's Witness),
or to have their children attend a school in a neighbouring municipality.
The onus is on the parent to show he has no other alternative available.
In Perepolkin v. Superintendent of Child Welfare (1957), 11
D.L.R. (2d) 417 (B.C.C.A.), Sidney Smith J.A. found that the Doukhabours
did not constitute a religious sect in the true legal sense and thus there
was no infringement of religious freedom by requiring the children to attend
public schools. As with the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Doukhabours
here believed that the public schools were exposing their children to
11
materialistic influences and ideals 11 •
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Limited litigation has left the Canadian case law devoid of
depth in analysis of these issues. None of the decisions provide the
degree of recognition of diverse and conflicting cultural values that
was evident in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.
Outside the education context, the issue of cultural diversity
frequently arises within child welfare cases where the courts must determine whether to find a child of another culture in need of protection.
Within the Native Indian population of Canada the problem of child
apprehension has been acute. 8 Historically, the Native Indian family
structure was self-supporting and had its own remedial systems before the
imposition of non-Native values upon the Native community. Douglas Sanders
described the effect of non-Native values on the Native community in his
report to The Law Reform Commission of Canada:
In the traditional and tribal way, there are no
unwanted children. Children are loved and cherished
and their parents place the utmost significance in
their children's lives because it means the continuation of themselves, of their tribal ways, and of the
living earth.
There are no orphans either because in the event
that a child's parents die, someone, a brother or
sister of the deceased or grandparents or other kin
will always take that child as their own. There is
always someone and some place for an Indian child to
go.
It has only been recently that there have been home1ess children: it can be said that this had been a
direct result of the Christianization of the Indian
people. When Indian people have been forced to
acculturate, to have to go away to school, when
missionaries imposed the Christian religion upon them,
then it was that Indian communities began to fragment.
As a result, Indian families which had been close and
intact began to fal1 apart a~d relationships were not
as close as before ....
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True, there are some cases of serious neglect of
children by Indian parents. The situation of Indians
in North America has led to drastic social disorganization in many cases, and often the children are the
first to suffer the effects. But often .Indian children
are taken into foster care through courts simply
because social workers feel they will give the children
a better opportunity off the reservation. Some social
workers dominate Indian communities so much that the
Indians no longer feel it worthwhile to protest the
frequent removal of children from homes....
9
With the growing consciousness of cultural preservation within
the Native community, programmes have been initiated to keep Native children
within the Native culture when it is deemed necessary to remove the child
from his family or when the child is in a position to be adopted.
These new programmes, however, need to be complemented by an
awareness at the judicial level of the diverse needs and values of the
Native communities. It is still the court, composed in most instances
of a single judge, which will decide when children are in need of protection and should be removed from the h0me. It is still the Canadian
courts, with few, if any, Native judges, which will oversee all family law
matters within the Native community. What principles, then, can a court
rely upon when deciding whether to remove the child from the Native family?
A preliminary principle is cautionary in nature. In their
recent book, Before the Best Interests of the Child, Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit argue that the state should only intervene in custodial and child
welfare determinations in a limited number of instances. lO There is a
strong onus upon the courts to show that threshold societal concerns are
being violated and that the state can provide a better alternative for the
child. Part of the rationale for this limited judicial role lies in the
fact that the state is 11 too crude an instrument to become an adequate substitute for flesh and blood parents 11 • 11 If the state must be cautious about
the apprehension of children from its own culture then it must be more
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cautious about the apprehension of children from other cultures. If the
state is a rough and crude device for supervising the complexity of
family relationships then it is even less adequate in supervising and
accomodating the family relationship within another cultural context.
The courts must therefore exercise caution in determining whether to
remove the child from the Native family.
Beyond this cautionary principle it is difficult to ascertain
non-culturally biased criteria for the apprehension of children. That
there are no absolutes was the lesson of Wisconsin v. Yoder. It follows,
then, that if a child is to be removed from his Native family, he should
be removed after considering the family situation in the context of the
particular Native community, rather than the standards of child care recognized by North American middle class society. Adopting this approach
requires a principle of identification to be utilized. Courts must seek
to define and elucidate the standards of the community with which they are
dealing. Courts must demand that the necessary evidence be presented. An
example of this approach is the recent decision of Provincial Judge Moxley
in Re E.C.D.M. (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 274 (Sask.Prov.Ct.). The respondent
mother was a 24 year old single Indian parent of Cree ancestry with a two
year old child. The mother lived in Northern Saskatchewan, had no permanent employment, suffered from alcoholism, and had no permanent residence.
The child had previously been found to be in need of protection and had
been committed to the temporary care of the Minister of Family Services.
The Department subsequently applied for a permanent order of wardship for
the two year old Ghild. The mother opposed the application and the matter
came on for trial. Judge Moxley adopted an identification principle in
defining the standard of state apprehension of children:
Furthermore, while there is a minimal parental standard
for all society, a secondary standard must be established
for parents of the age of the parent in question and for
the type of community in which the parent resides. A
teen-aged parent cannot live up to the standard expected
for a middle-aged parent. Similarly, different standards
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of parenting apply to parents of Cree ancestry who reside
in a small rural community in Northern Saskatchewan than
would apply to white middle-class parents living, for
example, in Regina. What is an acceptable standard for
the former might be unacceptable to the latter.
(at p. 275)
The court went on to describe the cultural and community features of Cree
and Chipewyan societies. Noteworthy among these features was the presence
of an extended family concept rather than a nuclear family concept as well
as an ethic of non-intervention which was extended to the disciplining of
children. 12 The court granted a permanent order committing the child to
the care of the Minister. The court found that living in crowded conditions
in a house owned by a relative, unemployment, lack of skills and problems
with alcohol were common factors in the area and were not a significant
departure from the community standard. Presumably, a permanent order would
not be made on these factors above. However, the court focused upon a
number of factors including the mother's lack of interest in her children,
her inability to look after her own most basic needs such as her failure to
acquire glasses or apply for social assistance payments, and substantial
problems with the mother's proposed living arrangements, and concluded that
the child was in need of protection. Judge Moxley believed that there was
little or no hope of improvement in the immediate future and therefore
ordered permanent commitment of the child to the care of the Minister. The
Saskatchewan court in this case adopted criteria for state intervention and
removal of the child which attempted to take into consideration the cultural
standards and living conditions of the society in which the child was born
and lived. Thus a cautionary approach and utilization of a principle of
identification are two guiding notions with which the court can deal with
the apprehension of children from other cultures~ especially Canada's diverse
· and multi-faceted Native communities.
The issue of cultural diversity presents a different problem
within the context of custody and access determinations and in the context
of cultural adoption. The difficult task for the courts is to choose between
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cultures; the court must decide in which cultural environment the child
should be raised. Should the child be brought up within the Catholic,
rural, French Canadian environment of the mother, or will the child be
better off within the more liberal, English, cosmopolitan lifestyle of
the father? 13 In another typical situation, should the child be in the
custody of the parent who professes little, if any, religious commitment
or should custody be given to the parent who is religiously active perhaps
to the degree of denying the child important medical services? 14 Within
the adoption context, should the court allow a child of one culture or
religion to be adopted by parents who have a different cultural lifestyle
or religion? 15 What principles can be utilized to enable a judge to make
the difficult choice between cultures without the judge being influenced
by his own culturally rooted assumptions of what cultural upbringing is best
for a child?
The analysis in Before the Best Interests of the Child is of
some assistance in seeking an analytical framework for determining custody
disputes. The authors argue that stability and continuity in the child's
lifestyle are crucial to the child's complete and normal development. It
is this need for continuity which in part forms the basis of the authors'
strong assertion for parental autonomy in the raising of children. 16 But
a child's lifestyle is a function of the cultural environment in which the
child develops; a child does not grow up in a cultural vacuum. A child has,
in addition to a set of recognizable individuals who surround him, a set
of habits, beliefs and perceptions which all reflect the particular cultural
climate in which that child is developing. It would seem, therefore, that
if stability and continuity are crucial to the healthy development of a child
then not only are the parental tie and parental autonomy important but
cultural autonomy or the child's tie to his cultural, social or religious
environment will be equally crucial in the development of the child. The
task for the court, then, is to both ascertain and understand that cultural
environment in which children before the court are developing. With all
other factors equal, the custodial determination should be significantly
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influenced by the cultural, religious or social orientation of the child.
This recommendation would fly in the face of such famous custody cases as
Painter v. Bannister (1966), 140 N.W. (2d) 152, where the Iowa Supreme
Court chose the cultural values of the grandparents over the non-traditional
west coast lifestyle of the father. The writer recognizes that all other
factors are never equal and that a child's cultural lifestyle will only be
one of a multitude of factors before a court in a custody hearing. Nevertheless, the child's link to his culture and background is a guiding
principle that must be given careful consideration and not overlooked in
attempting to ascertain the best interest of the child.
Support for the principle of cultural continuity can be found in
some recent Canadian custody cases. In Gauci v. Gauci (1972), 9 R.F.L. 189
(Ont.S.C.), Lacourcierre J. focused upon the change in the cultural environment that the child would be subjected to if moved from the interim custody
of his father to the care and control of his mother:
The main question in the present action is not one of
moral, intellectual or financial advantages, but whether
Brian Gauci should continue to develop according to the
cultural and spiritual tradition of his father's closelyknit family or whether he should be uprooted and taken
to a new environment in an effort to upgrade the quality
of his life. I am satisfied that the preponderance of
evidence points to the future happiness and welfare of
the child continuing to be served in the environment of
the Gauci family, with its cultural and religious
traditions.
(at p. 193)
In the case of Hayre v. Hayre (1973), 11 R.F.L. 188 (B.C.S.C.)
the court was squarely confronted with the issue of having to choose between
diverse cultural upbringings. The father adhered to the Sikh culture and
religion while the mother was a Protestant of Canadian-Irish extraction.
Mcintyre J. granted custody to the father and in doing so he focused upon
the preservation of the child's personal sense of religious and cultural
identity.
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This boy is a Sikh; he will always be regarded as a
Sikh in this country. It will be well for him to be
brought up as a Sikh, to preserve his existing knowledge of the Punjabi language, to be schooled in the
religion and traditions of the people with whom he
will always be associated. It will, in my view, be
possible for him to find a secure personal identity
only in the Sikh community. It is the only identity
our society will permit him. Let him, then, be a
Sikh and be proud of the tradition and accomplishments
of a proud and worthy race. No matter how much she
loves him, his mother cannot accomplish this. I
direct that custody of the boy be given to his father.
(at p. 188)
Utilizing a principle of cultural continuity req~ires the implementation of a two-step process. The court must first acknowledge that
between competing cultures, religions or lifestyles, neither is prima facie
to be preferred as the setting for the child. This analysis is often
complicated because of lack of knowledge by the judiciary of minority lifestyles as well as expressed preferences for the custodial parent or the
tender years doctrine. Secondly, the court must invoke the principle of
cultural continuity and evaluate in which cultural environment it is appropriate for the child to be raised. Such a two-stage approach was employed in
McQuillan v. McQuillan and Salomaa (1975), 21 R.F.L. 324 (Ont.C.A.). The
dispute for custody was between the 4-1/2 year old child's natural mother
and maternal grandmother. The grandmother had cared for the child much of
its life while the mother had spent much of her life wandering and searching for a fulfilling lifestyle. At the time of the trial the mother
belonged to the Hare Krishna movement and was attempting to teach its
principles to the child. O'Leary J. awarded custody to the grandmother but
not before setting out two helpful guiding notions. The court recognized
that it was not its function to pass judgment on the principles of the
Krishna movement. It stated that:
The court obviously has no right to dictate to parents
the religious philosophy they choose for themselves and
their children, let alone the right to deny custody to
a parent because of his or her religious beliefs.
(at p. 330)
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In addition, the court considered the stability and continuity in the
child's upbringing and found that life with the mother within the Krishna
movement would not be in the child's interest:
I have no confidence that she will remain in the
movement and, even if she does, that she has the
maturity to raise her son in the Kirshna movement
and give him the stimulation, opportunities and
stability necessary for his development.
(at p. 330)
The focus was therefore on stability and the mother's inability to provide
it rather than a focus on the lifestyle exemplified by the Krishna movement
per se.
Some Canadian cases within the child welfare context have also
exhibited a concern for cultural continuity. In Re P.S.B. (1978), 15
R.F.L. (2d) 199 (Ont.Prov.Ct., [Family Division]), the child was found to
be in need of protection and a temporary wardship order was made. The
child had been raised in the Jewish faith a~d, being fourteen years of
age, expressed a preference to be placed in a Jewish home. Judge Moore found:
Mareover, the evidence disclosed that, in the past,
she has been made to feel inferior and inadequate
because of her Jewish faith. If this court were to
deny a finding of Judaism, we would be perpetuating
and reinforcing this sense of inferiority and the
child would continue to be ashamed and embarrassed
because of her religion.
(at p. 202)
Judge Moore ordered that she be placed in the care of a Children's Aid
Society and in a Jewish home. The same concern for cultural continuity was
echoed in Mooswa et al. v. Minister of Social Services for the Province of
Saskatchewan (1976), 30 R.F.L. 101 (Sask.Q.B.), where the mother appealed a
Magistrate's order committing the child to the permanent care of the
Minister. Johnson J. stated that:
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What is basic in this kind of problem is the right
and need of the child to be raised, if possible, by
its natural mother in its natural environment and
its own cultural surroundings. Although the standard
of living provided by that mother and the care given
to the child may not be considered acceptable by
others, nevertheless if those ~tandards conform to
those considered average in the particular class or
group to which the parent(s) belong, the court ought
not to interfere.
·
(at p. 102)
Based on the mother s success in overcoming her alcoholism and her efforts
to improve her life, the court awarded custody to the mother where the child
would 11 be given the opportunity to be raised by her natural mother amongst
people of her own race and culture 11 • (at p. 102)
1

Other Canadian cases demonstrate that there is yet no clear
understanding of a consistent and predictable formula for dealing with
competing cultural interests. Our courts have tended to choose between
conflicting cultural values without clarifying or analysing the basis for
their decisions. For instance, in Robichaud v. Robichaud (1978), 6 R.F.L.
(2d) 232 (Sask.Q.B.), the custody dispute was between the mother and father.
The mother belonged to a sect wherein the children were separated from
parents and raised within an institutional setting. The two children of
the litigants had been living within this institutional scheme. The father,
who was found to be an exemplary parent, did not belong to the sect. In
awarding custody to the father, MacPherson J. preferred the one-to-one,
parent-child relationship over the institutional format of child rearing:
In matters of child welfare I have always regarded an
institution, however good, as something to be used in
an emergency only. In a choice between a competent
and loving parent, and an institution, however good,
I must, and I think our law must, prefer the parent.
(at p. 234)
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While the court's preference may have sound theoretical basis, that justification is lacking. Why is the natural parent to be preferred to the
institution? Does the answer lie within an historical prejudice or is it
best for the child to have an ongoing connection with the natural parent?
The Canadian family is being subjected to increased strains between the
concept of natural parenting and the concept of institutional parenting.
The gulf between parents and children in a cosmopolitan, technological
society is widening and some form of institutional care is often required
to fill the gap. Hopefully we share a sophisticated analysis and discussion
of these issues.
A similar problem is evident in the recent case of Elbaz v.
Elbaz (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 116 (Ont.H.C.J.). The custody dispute was
between the father who was born in Morocco of Orthodox Jewish parents and
the mother who is Canadian of a French, Roman Catholic background. The
wife converted to Judaism before the marriage but was not as devout as her
husband. Pennell J. awarded custody to the father and stated that:
The children have been raised by the parties in the
orthodox Jewish way of life. In my judgment, it is
in their best interests that they continue to have
that upbringing.
(at p. 127)
Once again the decision may have merit but it is totally devoid of analysis.
Why is it better that the children continue to have an orthodox Jewish
upbringing? Does the court's decision rest on the continuing stability of
the relationship of the children with the father, or is the court seriously
considering the cultural and religious background of the parents? The
decision examines the cultural issue relating to custody in a rather
cursory fashion and then attempts to construct an access regime which is both
unmanageable and unenforceable:
(1) For the first three week-ends each month from
Saturday 1 :00 p.m. to Monday 8:00 p.m.; two weeknights each month from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.,
namely, on Wednesday of the week before and the
Wednesday after the week-end when the children are
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in the care of the husband, except when the
Jewish High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah, Yorn Kippur,
Succoth, Passover and Shavuot fall on such days,
then on such days the husband shall have the care
of the children but an equivalent period of time
in each case shall be given to the wife in civic
holidays ....
(6) The wife, whenever the children are in her
care, shall ensure that the children eat kosher
food and observe as far as reasonably possible
the Shabbat, subject to the right to travel with
the children on Shabbat with tickets purchased in
advance. I use the words 11 as far as reasonably
possible 11 bearing in mind unusual situations. To
i 11 ustrate: 1ast summe'r the wife took the chi 1dren
on a vacation to Prince Edward Island. It happened,
as I am advised, that there was no synagogue there.
To the orthodox, the history of the Jewish people is
not because they contemplate God from an intellectual
point of view but because of observance. The wife
should therefore avoid exposing the children to
influences that are in conflict with orthodox Jewish
spiritual values.
(at pp. 128-129)
In other Canadian cases, courts have only utilized the first
step of what is necessarily a two-step process. Recognizing that no one
culture or religion is the touchstone of cultural propriety is not enough
to make a proper custodial determination; the courts must go the additional
step and determine the focus of stability and continuity in the child's
life. For example, in Benoit v. Benoit (1972), 10 R.F.L. 282 (Ont.Co.Ct.),
Beardall Co.Ct.J. considered the validity of an access order which prohibited
the father, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, from discussing religion
with the children. The court found that the restriction was not proper,
basing its decision on the premise that the court is in no position to
decide which is the 11 right 11 religion:
I do not think that any court has the right to decide
that one form of religious instruction and belief is
the true religion and that some other one is false, or
to say that one is better than the other, but that all
men are free to select their own religious belief and
to practice it without interference by someone else
thrusting upon them a religion that they do not care
for.
(at p. 284)
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By lifting the restriction on access the court recognized the limited
role it has as an arbiter of family disputes. Where children are involved the court's mandate is to determine the best interests of the
child which is primarily a custody determination. This issue was well
stated by Litsky Juvenile Ct.J. in Re M.(L. and K.) (1978), 6 R.F.L. (2d)
297 (Alta.Juv.Ct.), a case in which the children were apprehended from
parents who belonged to a cult society:
Freedom of religion is well protected in the province
of Alberta through its Alberta Bill of Rights, 1972
(Alta.), c.l, which is almost identical to s.l of the
Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III.
Freedom does not, however, include absolute freedom,
especially when it comes to the rights of children,
their best interests or welfare. Certainly the religious
concern of each person is a personal matter, but the
concern for children's upbringing is society's major
concern, and it has to be predicated by the court's
interpretation. The Alpha and Omega Order has a right
to an untrammelled religious belief, but it steps over
its bounds when it creates· an atmosphere which is not
conducive to allowing a child to reach his potential on
an individual basis. It cannot be stated too often
that it is the child's interests that are at stake, and
it should be remembered by members of the legal profession that the rule in neglect cases must be utilized
as a protection of the child and not necessarily as a
bulwark for the rights of parenthood.
(at p. 321)
The concern for the child's interests is the key. Cultural continuity
and stability are critical factors of those best interests. To act in the
child's best interests the court must take the active second step and
identify or protect the source of stability in the child's life.
Conclusion
The author has attempted to discuss some of the difficult issues
facing a culturally diverse nation and which confront the courts in child
welfare, child• custody and access, and in public education situations.
Intervention by the courts in custody and child welfare matters is severely
circumscribed by the authors of Before the Best Interests of the Child.
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Critics of the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit thesis have expressed concern
that they emphasize family integrity and parental autonomy to the exclusion of defining the rights of children. 17 Similarly, this author does
not wish to ignore the importance of the rights of children and specifically the need for Canadian courts to attempt to determine what is in
their best interest. Canadian courts must begin to deal with the difficult issues raised by both the majority and Mr. Justice Douglas in
Wisconsin v. Yoder. As Katheryn D. Katz writes in her review of Before
the Best Interests of the Child:
To suggest that the family integrity is a value of such
overriding significance that no other interest should be
considered is a simplistic resolution to parent-child
conflicts. There is a crucial issue raised by this book
that is not addressed: in a pluralistic society, how do
we foster diversity, plurality and individualism without
doing violence to children's interests in autonomy, freedom and dignity? Coercive state intervention has in
many instances led to unwarranted and harmful intrusions
into family privacy and integrity. The latitude afforded
the state must be curbed. However, a rigid doctrine of
deference to parental authority will redound to the
18
detriment of children.
As discussed above, it is impossible to set a closed set of
criteria by which judges could make determinations in situations involving
a conflict of cultural values. The concept of the family is amorphous
and culturally grounded thus precluding any a-cultural treatment of the
concept and similarly preventing any set of a-cultural values that attach
to the concept of the family from being defined. In addition, a set of
theoretical criteria could not be applied blindly without the benefit of
observing those ~ part~es who make a claim in the family dispute; family
law determinations involve complex factors which cannot be listed as static
indicia to be applied by the court. The principles discussed above are, at
best, principles of approach or attitude.
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The thematic or guiding principle is one of recognition or
consciousness of the diverse cultural interests which will often be present
in a family law dispute. Dealing with these divergent cultural values is
a legitimate and necessary function for the judiciary to undertake. Judges
must not mistake their own culturally biased values as a priori touchstones
of cultural sanctity. Rather, the role of the judiciary must be to balance
the competing cultural values that arise.
The second guiding principle is a principle of identification.
Judges must define, and demand the necessary evidence to do so, the cultural
backgrounds of the parties to the dispute. Only with this information will
the court be able to do the kind of delicate balancing of cultural values
that was done in Wisconsin v. Yoder and only with this information will the
court be able to identify the standards of a community for the purposes of
child apprehension disputes.
The third principle is best described as a principle of deference.
A strong onus must be satisfied before the courts can interfere with the
autonomy of parental rights and the continuity of the child's cultural lifestyle. Maintaining the cultural status guo is not the only factor in a
child custody determination, but it must be recognized as a relevant and
important factor.
Faced every day with the fact that Canada is culturally diverse,
Canadian courts are becoming attuned to the reality that the parties before
them will often seek to assert and preserve values other than those held
by the judiciary. If this diversity is to be maintained - if Canadian
society is to flourish with the synthesis of ideas and innovations that
cultural diversity fosters - then Canada's judiciary must be willing to deal
with cultural diversity as a legitimate issue. The judiciary must remain
cognizant of the fact that 11 a prime function of the law is to prevent one
person's truth •.. from becoming another person's tyranny 11 • 19
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